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I. Introduction
The following descriptive overview of the German corporate
governance system and the current debate is structured as
follows. Part II will give some information on the empirical
background. Part III will describe the formal legal setting as
well as actual practices in some key areas. Part IV will then
deal with some issues of the current debate.
II. The Empirical Background
1. Number of firms
Obtaining new reliable data on all firms in reunified Germany is
not yet possible. The only data I can offer here are as of 1990
and concern only the firms in former West Germany
1. There were
roughly 2,100,00 firms in Germany. Of these more than one and a
half million were run by a sole proprietor, about 250,00 by
partnerships and a slightly larger number (265,00) by
corporations. As the corporate governance issue is mainly, from
a practical point of view, an issue involving large, publicly-
held corporations, let us break these numbers of corporations
down into those of privately and of publicly-held corporations.Fehl
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Of the 265,000 corporations about 263,000 were private
companies with limited liability and less than 1,800
were stock corporations. Of the latter only about 80
are widely held
2. However, most of these corporations
with widely distributed ownership are among the 100
largest firms in Germany
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Table 1
Sole ownership 1,545,264
Partnerships
- Offene Handelsgesellschaft 173,294
- Kommanditgesellschaft 85,219
Corporations
- Aktiengesellschaft (1) 1,717
- GmbH (2) 263,341
Other (3) 35,139
Total 2,103,974
Numbers as of 1990. Source: See footnote 1. The numbers cover the turnover-tax paying firms
in former West Germany. Most farmers, doctors, dentists and several other professions are
excluded.
_______________
1) Stock corporations (includes Kommanditgesellschaften auf Aktien).
2) Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung (private companies with limited liability).
3) Including Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften, firms in public law form,
branches of foreign firms.
2. Structure of Ownership
We can already gather from these numbers that the description of
the German corporate governance system as "bank-orientated" is a
misnomer if we look at all firms. The bulk of our industry is
still made up of small and medium-sized firms (the
"Mittelstand") which are owned by sole proprietors, families or
partners. Banks play a particular role in corporate governanceFehl
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only in our comparatively few "stock corporations" with
small, scattered shareholders. I will get back to the
role of banks in corporate governance in these
companies later.
First, let us have a more detailed look into the
structure and distribution of ownership in our firms.
Participations or shares can be held by:
- private owners or families;
- other firms;
- the public sector;
- financial institutions;
- foreigners.
Exact data for all firms are not available. The following table
shows the distribution of ownership of foreign as well as
domestic shares in public companies limited by shares
(Aktiengesellschaften) held by German investors. This chart
gives us at least a rough impression of the distribution of
ownership in the group of firms which is of interest here with
respect to the corporate governance issue.Fehl
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Table 2
Distribution and development of ownership
in domestic shareholdings1) (in %)
Sector 1960 1970 1980 1990
Private households 27 28 19 17
Firms 44 41 45 42
Public sector 14 11 10 5
Foreign firms/investors 6 8 11 14
Banks 6 7 9 10
Insurance companies/
Pension Funds 3 4 6 12
1) Source: Monatsberichte der Deutschen Bundesbank, Oct. 1991, at p. 28.
How are these data to be interpreted?
a) Private households
The table shows that shareholdings of private households
declined steadily since 1960. There are various factors which
contributed to this development:
- conservative savings patterns in our households (in 1991
shares made up only DM 1.1 billion as compared to a total of DM
3,098 billion in assets for all West German private households
4);
- peculiarities of our social security system
5;
- a still smaller and less-developed securities market than,
e.g., in the U.K.
b) FirmsFehl
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Other firms are by far the most dominant group of
shareholders. A study recently estimated that as much
as 90 % of all domestic stock corporations and more
than 50 % of all German partnerships are members of
groups of two or more firms which are locked to each
other by personal and/or capital links
6. This feature
leads to special problems in terms of corporate governance, and
our German company law developed an extensive set of rules, the
"Konzernrecht", which especially deals with groups of companies
7.
c) Foreign investors
Our numbers reveal that, since 1960, foreign investments in
German stock corporations increased steadily. This increase
again poses some new policy questions with respect to corporate
governance, as foreign private and institutional investors tend
not to vote their shares but to remain passive
8.
d) Banks
German banks may hold stock in non-bank firms for their own
account
9. Our figures here show that banks in 1990 held about
10 % of all domestic or foreign shares held by German investors.
These holdings range from small stakes up to controlling blocks
in single cases. The credit sector as a whole held in November
1993  4,310 participations of 10 % or more of the equity capital
of non-bank firms
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e) Insurance companies; pension funds
According to table 2 insurance companies and pension
funds together held 12 % of all shares in 1990. This
statistic may surprise foreign observers, especially as
far as pension funds are concerned. Private pension
funds with huge amounts of shares like, for instance, in the
U.S. or the U.K., do not exist in Germany. Our pension payments
system rests on three pillars: the public security system,
private pension savings, and, third, business-related pension
money. But this pension money is kept mainly by the business
firms in their treasury and invested within the company. The
companies that have promised pension payments to their employees
are legally bound to contribute to a kind of mutual reinsurance
which guarantees the payments. Out of the total of DM 345
billion in pension obligations of German companies in 1990, only
DM 82.5 billion were funded through external pension funds
11.
3. An example: Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Let us end our empirical overview by taking a closer look at one
more or less typical example of a large stock corporation with
scattered shareholders, Siemens Aktiengesellschaft.
In 1990, Siemens had a stock capital of DM 2,608 million and
about 583,000 shareholders. 52 % of the share capital was held
by German investors, 43 % by foreign investors (5 % remained
unclear); cf. figure 1. That makes it clear to what extent our
capital markets especially in Europe have already grown
together. If we break these numbers down into various groups of
shareholders, the following picture emerges (cf. figure 2,
below):
By far the highest amount of the share capital (45 %) was held
by private owners (still among them the Siemens family with a
stake of about 10 % preferred shares).
The next group is made up of insurance companies, investment
funds, and banks with holdings of about 26 %. They are followedFehl
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by equity links between Siemens and other firms (about
7 %) and other investors (7 %).Fehl
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I should mention at this stage how the shares are voted
in the shareholders' meetings of Siemens. In 1987,
about 60 % of Siemens' shares were represented at the
meeting. Of these almost 90 % were represented and
voted by banks, which act mainly by virtue of proxies
given to them by shareholders. Among these the biggest
German bank, Deutsche Bank, voted 17,8 %; Dresdner Bank 10,7 %;
Commerzbank 4,1 %; all other banks 32,5 %
12. These figures show
that the banks together clearly dominate the field; and it
means, on the other hand, that no single bank alone holds - at
least at the Siemens' meetings - a controlling block.
III. The Corporate Governance Structure
In the following I will first try to describe the formal legal
setting as far as stock corporations are concerned and to the
extent necessary to understand the instruments and the
functioning of corporate governance in these corporations.
1. The legal framework
Stock corporations or public companies limited by shares
(Aktiengesellschaften) are regulated under the Stock Corporation
Act (Aktiengesetz) of 1965
13.
This Act contains for the most part binding rules concerning the
foundation and constitution of such corporations, the organs and
their duties, the rights of shareholders, rules concerning the
(fixed) capital of the corporation, the issuance of shares, the
dissolution of the company and other matters. Further parts of
the Act deal with the law of groups of companies
("Konzernrecht") as far as stock corporations are involved;
furthermore with mergers and transformations into other legal
forms. Right now the federal authorities (Federal Ministry of
Justice) are considering an amendment concerning the rules for
mergers and transformations
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Other important acts which supplement the Stock
Corporation Act are the Codetermination Acts
(Mitbestimmungsgesetze) and the Commercial Code
(Handelsgesetzbuch).
2. The Stock Corporation as a legal entity
According to German law, stock corporations are legal
entities. They have to have at least one shareholder. As in
principle only the corporation and not its shareholders can be
held liable for the company's debts, the shareholders have to
invest a fixed (published) minimum amount of money (fixed
capital; "Grundkapital", at least DM 100,000); and there are
binding rules which protect the company's funds from attempts by
the shareholders to distribute or dilute this protected capital
stock.
The concept of the stock corporation as a legal entity has still
another aspect which is of interest in our context here.
Formerly, in the early nineteenth century, jurisprudence and
legal scholars held the view that stock corporations were based
on a contract among the shareholders, and that these
shareholders should, at least "internally" or "materially", be
considered to be the true owners of the company's assets. The
famous legal scholar Friedrich Carl von Savigny, professor of law
and, in 1843, as a minister in Prussia in charge of the new
legislation for stock corporations, expressed this view as
follows: "Für diese Auffassung spricht der Umstand, daß
ursprünglich [i.e., before incorporation by the government,
T.B.] gewiß eine reine Sozietät (also Miteigentum der Einzelnen)
vorhanden ist, und daß die spätere Erteilung der
Korporationsrechte gewiß nicht dazu bestimmt ist, das innere
Rechtsverhältnis wesentlich umzuändern"
15. This doctrine had
remarkable consequences like, e.g., a contractual duty of fair
treatment and consideration for the other shareholders. And it
had also clear consequences for their rights as "true co-owners"
vis-à-vis the company's management
16. Whether this doctrine of
the corporation as a set or web of contracts ever reflected the
details of the legal framework, the opinion of the courts andFehl
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the actual behaviour in practice, seems doubtful. In
any event, at least after the first World War, this
legal doctrine was abandoned. The political and social
reasons for this development cannot be decribed here
17.
Pathbreaking was a small essay by the industrialist and
later German foreign minister, Walter Rathenau
18.
Today the participation and role of the employees in corporate
governance, the "codetermination", bars any doctrine or notion
of the stock corporation as strictly a convention of, or a web
of contracts among, its shareholders. Other stakeholders,
especially the employees, are considered to be "members" of the
firm ("Unternehmen") as well, although with different rights.
One consequence of this development for corporate governance is
that management is held to also take the interests of the other
stakeholders into consideration
19, which means in practice that
management is given more leeway to make decisions at its
discretion. According to German law, management is not obliged
to maximize the value of the shares. Whether this is an
economically sound and recommendable structure is, of course,
another question.
As we are among lawyers here I cannot forgo to add that micro-
economic theory apparently lags long behind legal theory:
Microeconomics discovered the "Firm as a Nexus of Treaties" or a
web of contracts among all stakeholders only recently
20.
3. The company organs
Stock corporations have three organs: the shareholders' meeting
("Hauptversammlung"), the supervisory board ("Aufsichtsrat"),
and the management board ("Vorstand"). The supervisory board is
supported by independent auditors who have to check the annual
statements of account. A more detailed picture would reveal a
complex structure of balance of powers between these three
organs. Some key points should, however, be mentioned.
a) The formal regulationFehl
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The shareholders' meeting is not considered to be the
highest or the chief organ of the stock corporation.
Its powers are limited to clearly defined basic
decisions such as changes of statutes, approval of the
annual statements of accounts, distribution of (half
of) the annual balance-sheet profits, consent to some specific
structural changes such as mergers, issuance of new stock and
the like
21. It elects the members of the supervisory board, as
far as these are representatives of the shareholders and not to
be appointed by the employees' side. But it is not entitled to
give any instructions either to the supervisory or to the
management board. Let me add that the position or legal rights of
the single shareholder vis-à-vis management and the members of the
supervisory board could still be improved. There is, for
instance, no derivative suit in German law
22.
The German two-tier or dual boards system which distinguishes between
a management board and a separate supervisory board was already
established in 1870. Originally the supervisory board was
designed to represent the shareholders vis-à-vis the management
of the firm, and control it in lieu of the shareholders. Today
it has a different function. It represents - at least in all
larger stock corporations - the employees as well.
The codetermination system involves members of the supervisory
board who are elected by the employees or appointed by the trade
unions. In firms with more than 500 employees, one third of the
members of the Aufsichtsrat is elected by the employees. In
companies with more than 2 000 employees, this number goes up to
one half of the members of the supervisory board. Among the
representatives of the employees at least two are appointed by
the labor unions
23. In groups of firms ("Konzern"), the employees
of the dependent firms are, other than the shareholders of such
firms, entitled to co-elect the board members of the top
(governing) company.Fehl
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The supervisory board appoints the members of the
managing board (mostly for five years) and may dismiss
them, though only for cause. It is responsible for
monitoring the management, although, practically, it
acts as an advisory committee rather than as a
monitoring panel except in times of financial distress
of the firm. To accomplish its duties, the board has the right
to receive comprehensive information. Management must report to
it periodically on all important questions, and the supervisory
board may always ask the management for reports. The supervisory
board reviews the annual reports and balance sheets of the firm.
The board may require management to obtain its prior approval
before entering into certain important transactions.
The chair of the supervisory board has a particularly influential
position. He prepares the - comparatively infrequent
24 - meetings
of the board, proposes the agenda, and stays in steady contact
with the management. Management has to brief the chair
immediately on all important decisions. If there is a stalemate
in a vote by the board under a codetermination regime (a rare
event), the chairman who is elected by the shareholders and not
by the employees, breaks the tie.
b) Practical example: Siemens Aktiengesellschaft
Figure 3 below shows the corporate governance structure of
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft. The structure is not the same one
for every stock corporation, as the number of the members of the
supervisory board and the representatives of the labour unions
vary with the number of employees of the respective company.Fehl
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4. The Practice of Internal Monitoring
In the following section I will try to describe briefly
how corporate governance works in practice in large
widely-held stock corporations.
Here we should look, first, at the role of the banks,
and, second, at the role and performance of the main
internal monitor of management, the supervisory board
25.
a) The role of the banks
Banks play a role in corporate governance in Germany especially
in big-widely-held firms in several respects:
- as creditors (the importance of loan finance for big firms
and the relevance of credit finance for corporate monitoring is
omitted in the following
26);
- as shareholders;
- as proxy holders;
- by personal interlocks with the respective firms.
aa) Bank control of proxies
Banks vote the stock of clients who have deposited their shares
with them. In order to do so they need a special written power
of authority. This proxy cannot be given for more than fifteen
months, and it is revocable at any time. Before a shareholders'
meeting, banks have to recommend to their customers how to vote
and must ask for special instructions. As a practical matter,
special instructions are extremely rare. If the shareholder does
not give the bank special instructions, the bank is to vote
according to its recommendations. Generally, banks can vote
their customers' stock on any matter. In its own shareholders'
meetings, however, a bank may only vote stock if it receives
explicit instructions from its shareholders
27.Fehl
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The following table 3 shows the voting blocks at the
shareholders' meetings of 33 widely-held stock
corporations among the 100 largest firms in 1986. Note
that this statistic adds own holdings of banks, the
holdings of bank subsidiaries, and the banks' proxy
holdings.
According to Gottschalk's study, banks represented more than four-
fifths (82.67 %) of all votes present in the meetings.
Consequently, they were able to elect the members of the
supervisory board as far as these are elected by the
shareholders. The breakdown in our table shows also that the
voting rights are highly concentrated in the three largest
private banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank).Fehl
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bb) Banks as shareholders
I have already mentioned that, according to German
banking law, credit institutions may acquire and hold
participations in non-bank firms
28. The real extent of
such holdings, especially in big firms, is still
unclear, as these holdings have only to be disclosed if they
exceed 20 % of the respective firm's capital
29. This threshold
will be lowered to 5 % in the near future
30. Table 3 above
comprises the votes which come from shares held by banks on
their own account.
Participations in non-bank firms can be held either directly by
a bank or by a subsidiary. An important role for our issue is
played by so-called "Vorschaltgesellschaften". These are firms
in which financial as well as other firms hold small stakes of,
say, 10 %. The Vorschaltgesellschaft itself holds a stake in a
publicly-held corporation. This structure serves as an
antitakeover device; I will get back to it later.
Another important source of influence of banks by votes stems
from the holdings of investment funds which are subsidiaries of
banks. According to German banking law, banks and insurance
companies may set up and run investment funds, which then may
acquire and hold equity stakes in firms. Although the law asks
investment fund managers to vote the shares themselves and not
to give proxies to third parties
31, this provision does not
exclude an informal agreement between the fund manager and the
parent bank about how to vote.
cc) Personal interlocks
Considering the extent of influence of banks at the
shareholders' meetings, it should not be surprising that there
are personal interlocks between seats on the supervisory boards
of the respective firms and the representatives of banks.
Influence on management, its decisions, its appointment and
dismissal is not exercized directly by the shareholders but byFehl
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the supervisory board, as has been shown above.
Therefore, seats on the supervisory board are crucial
for every shareholder or institution that wants to have
a say in corporate governance, obtain relevant
information, etc. Table 4 shows the personal interlocks
among firms and banks within the group of the largest
100 German companies in 1990.
Table 4
Personal direct interlocks between firms and banks
(both out of the group of the 100 largest enterprises)
     
     Number
of the firms
Rank Year Bank (B)
into whose which
supervisory sent their
board B sent managers
its managers into the
supervisory
board of B
14 1990 Deutsche Bank 35 2
20 1990 Dresdner Bank 19 1
23 1990 Commerzbank 16 4
36 1990 Bayerische
Vereinsbank 3 2
52 1990 Bayerische Hypo-
theken- und
Wechselbank 2 4
73 1990 Westdeutsche
Landesbank 5 1
93 1990 DG Bank
Deutsche Genossen-
schaftsbank 5 0Fehl
er!
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Source: Neuntes Hauptgutachten der Monopolkommission, Bundestags-
Drucksache 12/3031, at p. 228-232.
dd) Policy issues
The role of the banks in corporate governance has been
discussed and questioned since decades. This discussion
centers mainly around their own holdings and the "accumulation
of power" stemming from the various sources of influence.
However, as far as the depositary voting system is concerned,
almost no one really wants to do away completely with the
proxies for banks and choose another system, like, e.g., proxies
for management, as found in the U.S.
32. The present debate
centers around certain improvements like disclosure of conflicts
of interests, disqualification of banks from voting in certain
cases, reports to the shareholders, and others. On Dec. 8, 1993,
a hearing was held by the Committee on Economic Affairs (Wirt-
schaftsausschuß) of the Federal Parliament where these issues
were discussed
33.
b) Performance of supervisory boards
Although the supervisory board in the German system is separated
by law from management, and although it is the shareholders (the
depot institutions and other shareholders) as well as the
employees who elect the members of the supervisory board rather
than management itself or even a CEO, there is growing
dissatisfaction with the way supervisory boards work and
perform
34. Apart from some more anecdotal evidence, however,
reliable empirical work on the performance of our supervisory
boards is scant
35. The Committee on Economic Affairs
(Wirtschaftsausschuß) of the Federal Parliament recently dealt
with this issue. Various policy recommendations have been put
forward in the literature, but no legislative action has been
considered thus far. The whole issue is politically sensitive as
the system of codetermination could be affected.Fehl
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5. External Monitoring
a)  External vs. internal monitoring
Theoretically, there are several instruments and
devices which can serve to align the interests of
management with those of the stockholders, employees,
and creditors of a firm:
¨ monitoring of the management by the supervisory board;
¨ pressure from the product markets as far as these are
competitive;
¨ competition in the market for managers;
¨ incentives in contracts, with the compensation of managers
tied to their performance;
¨ monitoring by creditors;
¨ the threat of bankruptcy and the loss of prestige and
reputation;
¨ legal rules under which managers must act with loyalty and
reasonable care with respect to the firm and its various
stakeholders;
¨ the threat of hostile takeovers ("market for corporate
control").
Not all these devices are thought of as pursuing the same goal.
The liability rules, for example, are more concerned with
misbehaviour such as self-interested conduct by management,
rather than with monitoring managerial efficiency.
In the following I will not deal with all of these instruments
for "internal" and "external" monitoring but will confine myself
to hostile takeovers within our corporate governance system.Fehl
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b) Public hostile takeover bids
To date, no public hostile takeover bid has been
successful in Germany. The attempt of the French
company AGF to take over the insurer AMB has recently
been settled by an agreement, and the attack launched
by Italy's Pirelli on the German tire maker Continental AG has
been warded off successfully by the support of German banks and
the government of a Federal State
36. The reasons for these few
attempts and the impediments to hostile takeovers have been
described in depth already
37. Let me mention only some few of
them:
- There are comparatively few possible targets for public
hostile takeovers on the German market.
- The role of banks in the respective firms as large proxy
holders makes hostile takeovers unlikely.
- Further impediments are the two-boards structure and the
role that employees play in corporate governance in Germany.
- There are statutory provisions against hostile takeovers,
particularly caps on voting rights ("Höchststimmrechte"),
especially in our large widely held stock corporations
38.
- Many large corporations with widely-distributed stock have
equity links to each other by means of small holding companies
("Vorschaltgesellschaften") for the purpose of acting as a white
knight in case of a hostile takeover attempt (see figure 4,
below).
German industry as well as our government has always, until
today, blocked plans of the EC-Commission to introduce
legislation that would ease hostile takeovers. The debate
whether and under what conditions hostile takeovers should be
permitted ist still continuing
39.Fehl
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IV. The Present Debate and Ongoing Work
What are the issues of the current corporate governance
debate in Germany? What is on the agenda and which
questions or reforms can be expected to come to the
forefront in the near future?
There are, to my knowledge, three major issues which
can be identified in this respect.
1. "Finanzplatz Deutschland"
A remarkable effort has been made to promote "Finanzplatz
Deutschland" by both the government and the (financial) business
community for quite some time. This effort has certainly been
given a boost by the decision of the EC to place the European
central bank in Frankfurt. These circumstandes have a lot of
impact on, and bring quite of lot of changes for, our large
firms, the way how they are financed, disclosure requirements,
and the traditional bank-firm relationships in Germany. Let me
just mention a few points.
A draft of the "Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz" as of
August 1993 provides that a new Federal office will be
established with the task of supervising the securities markets.
The same draft act provides for binding insider rules and
contains disclosure requirements. In former acts the Federal
Parliament has already lifted impediments to immediate market
financing of firms by debt or equity securities.
The relationships between our large firms and credit
institutions have been in a state of flux for years because of
increasing competition from foreign institutions as well as
changing financial conditions and new or improved financing
instruments. All this has, of course, influence on corporate
governance within these large firms.
2. The Hearing of the Committee on Economic Affairs on the
"Power of Financial Institutions" of Dec. 8, 1993
As I have mentioned earlier, on Dec. 8, 1993, the Committee on
Economic Affairs of the Federal Parliament held a public hearingFehl
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on the "Power of Banks and Insurance Companies". The
Committee put a list of questions to legal and economic
scholars as well as to several Federal authorities and
lobbyists. The list concerned questions like
- whether equity holdings by financial institutions
in non-bank firms should be limited;
- whether and how the actual depositary voting system in
Germany should be changed or amended;
- what steps should be taken in order to improve the
performance of our supervisory boards;
- whether and how personal and capital interlocks between
financial firms should be treated.
As one might expect, views on these topics and on the need for
reform were not unanimous. Whether and in what direction the
Federal Parliament will act in this or that respect remains
completely unclear. Changes cannot be expected in the next
future.
3. The Law of Groups of Firms
A separate set of elaborated rules for "Groups of Firms" is a
favorite child both for our legislation and for German legal
scholars. There is an eminent body of literature on how
corporate governance works and is affected within groups of
companies. What are the rights of shareholders if management
decides to set up separate units and conduct the business of the
group in subsidiaries rather than in the parent companies? How
can the rights of the supervisory board of the parent company in
such a case be preserved? How does the influence of a parent
company on the management of a subsidiary influence the rights
of the subsidiary's shareholders and its supervisory board? How
can these new agency problems be solved? This discussion is
still in full flux both in the academic literature as well as in
the rulings of the Federal Civil Court
41. A report about thisFehl
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discussion would, however, require another
comprehensive article.Fehl
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* Dr. jur., Professor, Universität Osnabrück/Germany;
Director, Institut für Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht,
Universität Osnabrück, Katharinenstr. 15, D-49069 Osnabrück.
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